Future Psychological Evolution
John Stewart
ABSTRACT: Humans are able to construct mental representations
and models of possible interactions with their environment. They can use these
mental models to identify actions that will enable them to achieve their
adaptive goals. But humans do not use this capacity to identify and implement
the actions that would contribute most to the evolutionary success of humanity.
In general, humans do not find motivation or satisfaction in doing so, no
matter how effective the actions might be in evolutionary terms. From an
evolutionary perspective, this is a significant limitation in the psychological
adaptability of humans. This paper sets out to identify the new psychological
capacity that would be needed to overcome this limitation and how the new
capacity might be acquired.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Is the psychological evolution of humanity at an endpoint? Or are there
limitations and deficiencies in our psychological capacities that could drive
further evolution? Are there, for example, new forms of psychological software
that humans could acquire to improve our ability to adapt to whatever
challenges face us in the future?
One way we can begin to answer this question is to ask whether there
are blind spots in our current psychological capacities. Are our existing
abilities to discover and implement useful adaptive behaviours seriously
limited? Are we unable to explore areas of the space of adaptive possibilities?
If we discover that there are limitations in our current psychological
capacities, we can then ask whether these can be overcome by changes to our
psychological software. Can our psychological adaptability be improved by, for
example, the acquisition of new psychological skills and capacities? Can these
be developed through learning and appropriate experiences?
If we find that there are limitations, and if these can only be
overcome by changes to our psychological software, we can then ask whether
humans are likely to make these changes. Will we do what is required to develop
the software? Will we be motivated to make whatever effort is necessary to
evolve our psychology? Or are humans caught in an evolutionary predicament—are
we unable to make these psychological improvements because of the limitations
in our psychological adaptability?
We begin in section 2 by identifying significant limitations in our
current psychological capacities. Section 3 of the paper examines how these
could be overcome by the acquisition of new psychological abilities, and
section 4 assesses the likelihood that humans will develop these capacities.
2.
CURRENT PSYCHOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS
What are the strengths and weaknesses of our current psychological
adaptive capacities?
Our main strength compared with other organisms is our ability to use
mental models to discover and implement useful adaptations (see, for example,
Popper, 1972 and Dennett, 1995). Instead of having to try out alternative
actions in practice, humans can use mental models to predict the effects of the
alternatives. Using representations of ourselves and of our environment, we can
try out possible adaptations mentally. This significantly reduces the need for
costly trial and error, and enables us to take account of the (predicted)
future consequences of our actions.
Our ability to test alternative behaviours mentally is the basis of our capacity to plan ahead, imagine alternatives, invent and adapt technology, build structures such as houses and roads, radically modify our external environment for our adaptive goals, establish long-term objectives, imagine how we might change the world, develop strategic plans, design projects and undertake activities that pay off only in the future, such as plant crops and feed animals.
The acquisition of language greatly enhanced our capacity for mental
modelling. Language and associated forms of communication enabled humans to
share the knowledge that is used to construct useful models of reality. All members of a society could eventually
acquire and use the knowledge discovered by any individual. This enabled
knowledge to be accumulated across the generations. The progressive
accumulation of knowledge has enabled humans to model more accurately a greater
range of interactions with our environment, and to predict the consequences of
our actions over wider scales of space and time (Stewart, 1995). This has
enabled us to discover more effective ways of achieving our adaptive goals.
Our ability to construct and manipulate models has also improved as we
have learnt to augment our mental abilities with external artefacts such as pen
and paper, books, recording devices, computers and other forms of artificial
intelligence.
Our mental adaptability can be expected to continue to improve as humanity
accumulates more knowledge about how the external world responds to our
interventions and as artificial intelligence is developed further.
In principle, we could use mental modelling to greatly enhance our
evolutionary adaptability. We could use mental modelling to discover and
implement adaptations that are best for humanity in evolutionary terms. We
could do this by using modelling to identify the future consequences of
alternative actions, including their evolutionary effects. This would enable us
to determine which actions would contribute best to the evolutionary success of
humanity. We would be as effective at discovering the best adaptations as our
models allowed. As our modelling capacity improved, humanity would be able to
adapt successfully to a wider range of evolutionary challenges.
The use of mental modelling for evolutionary adaptation would easily
outperform gene-based natural selection. Genetic evolution is largely blind and
operates by trial and error. It has no capacity to predict the future effects
of alternative adaptations and to use these predictions to identify the best
adaptation. Furthermore, genetic evolution cannot learn and accumulate
knowledge throughout the life of the individual. And it is unable to establish
adaptations that benefit only future generations and not the organism itself
[and its genes] (see for example, Stewart, 1997a). Once a species has
accumulated sufficient knowledge, the use of mental modelling for evolutionary
adaptation would enable it to adapt to a much wider range of events than a
similar species that evolves genetically.
However we do not use our mental modelling in this way. We do not use
it to discover and implement the adaptations that will deliver evolutionary
success to humanity. Most humans are unconcerned about the evolutionary
consequences of their actions. Instead we use the enormous power of mental
modelling to see how we can act on the world to produce desirable psychological
states and avoid unpleasant ones. For most this means using modelling to pursue
sex, wealth, satisfying relationships, social status, fame and so on.
An evolutionary perspective helps explain this state of affairs. As we
have seen, evolution would favour species that use mental modelling for
evolutionary adaptation. Once such a species emerged, it would flourish. But
evolution was not able to produce this capacity immediately in the evolution of
life on Earth. A brain that is capable of mental modelling took a very long
time to evolve by the blind trial-and-error of genetic evolution.
Until mental modelling evolved, gene-based natural selection had to
find simpler arrangements to adapt organisms during their life. The simplest way to achieve this was to fit
out the organism with arrangements that discovered adaptations by trial and
error. These arrangements would make changes in the organism until a change is
made that is found to be adaptive in evolutionary terms. But what arrangements
within the organism could ‘know’ whether a particular change is adaptive? The answer
is easy to see when the event to which the organism must adapt disrupts the
effective functioning of the organism—changes can be tested on the basis of
their ability to restore effective functioning (Ashby, 1960). For example, an
organism trying to outrun a predator might deplete the oxygen in its leg
muscles below the level needed for peak performance. Increases in the
organism’s heart rate could be tried out until oxygen levels are restored and
the leg muscles are able to perform effectively again. But this method will not
work when an adaptive change produces only future benefits to the organism, and
does not produce any immediate improvement within the organism (Beer, 1972).
Examples include actions that organize sexual reproduction, and much of the
behaviour that protects social status within a group. Neither of these
generates any immediate benefits to the organism that could be used as
indicators of the usefulness of the behaviour.
How could gene-based natural selection organise an organism so that
changes that produce no immediate benefit to the organism, but produce
evolutionary benefits in the longer term, would be selected as adaptations? How
could possible adaptations be tested within the organism to identify those that
produced benefits only in the longer term?
The simplest way is to test them against proxies for future evolutionary
success. Natural selection could fit out organisms with a system of internal
goals and rewards whose satisfaction is correlated with evolutionary success.
Possible adaptations would be tested within the organism against their ability
to achieve the internal goals or rewards (Frank, 1988. See also Stewart,
1997b).
Such an organism would spend its life pursuing these internal rewards
and goals. This would be experienced by the organism as responding to
motivations and to emotional states and impulses. The genetic evolutionary
mechanism would tune these so that when the organism pursued its internal
rewards, it would act in a way consistent with evolutionary success. For
example, actions that organise sexual reproduction could be rewarded with
pleasurable feelings, and behaviour that could destroy an individual’s
reputation within its social group could be deterred by unpleasant feelings of
guilt.
Until they acquire a capacity for mental modelling, organisms have to
be organised in this way to pursue proxies for evolutionary success. But even
when mental modelling finally emerges, organisms would still have to be
organised to pursue the goals established by their internal reward system. This
is because mental modelling will be grafted on to an organism whose adaptation
is already organised by an internal motivation and reward system. Gene-based
natural selection can only build on whatever is already available. Furthermore,
mental modelling will not have the capability to immediately take over the
adaptation of the organism. The organisms would not have accumulated the
detailed knowledge and information needed for their models to be able to
predict the future consequences of a wide range of alternative
actions—modelling will be less effective than the pre-existing motivation and
reward systems at discovering the best adaptations (Stewart, 2000).
But mental modelling will still provide immediate advantages. It
enables the organism to find better ways of achieving its internal rewards and
motivations. The organism can use mental models to identify the behaviours that
will be best at achieving outcomes that produce desirable internal states.
Initially mental modelling will not establish the adaptive goals of the
organism—it begins as a servant of the pre-existing motivation and reward
systems.
However, clashes and contradictions will begin to emerge as the
superior adaptive potential of mental modelling begins to be realised (Stewart,
2000). As the organisms accumulate knowledge they will be able to predict the
consequences of alternative behaviours more accurately and further into the
future. The modelling capacity will begin to suggest different adaptations to
those supported by the pre-existing internal reward system. The superior
adaptive ability of mental modelling will enable the organism to see that
particular behaviours are in its interests, but the behaviours are not
motivated or rewarded by its pre-existing systems. In some circumstances, its
pre-existing systems may strongly motivate behaviours that the organism now
sees are against its interests. Increasingly as knowledge accumulates, what the
organism wants to do (as motivated by its pre-existing systems) will clash with
what it sees mentally is in its interests, particularly in the longer term.
Eventually the organisms are likely to accumulate sufficient knowledge
to model and understand the evolutionary processes that have produced them.
They will begin to understand that the clashes they are experiencing between
their adaptive systems are symptoms of their participation in a major
evolutionary transition. They will see that they are located in a sequence that
has the potential to move from an organism that is organised by evolution to
pursue proxies for evolutionary success, to an organism that uses mental
modelling to consciously identify and implement whatever actions will
contribute most to the evolutionary success of the species.
It is possible to locate humanity within this sequence. As we have
already noted, humans are not yet an organism that uses mental modelling to
adapt in whatever ways are needed for evolutionary success. We are not
motivated to do so—the evolutionary consequences of our actions are largely
irrelevant to us. Instead we use our mental modelling to work out how to
achieve the goals set by our internal reward and motivation system—goals that
humans have been fitted out with by natural selection and that are modified to
a limited extent by conditioning during their upbringing.
We spend our lives pursuing desirable psychological states such as
those associated with popularity, self-esteem, sex, feelings of uniqueness,
power, food, and social status, and we try to avoid undesirable psychological
states such as those associated with stress, guilt, depression, loneliness,
hunger, and shame. It is of little or no concern to us whether these proxies
for evolutionary success in fact encourage behaviour that will bring
evolutionary success. When our evolutionary interests clash with our
motivations and emotional responses, our evolutionary interests lose out. In
this way, our motivation and reward system severely constrains how we are able
to adapt and what we can choose to do.
But humans are increasingly encountering situations where our mental
models suggest different adaptations to those motivated by our pre-existing
internal reward systems. Our mental models are becoming sophisticated enough to
out-perform our internal reward system in many situations. For example, many
find that we are motivated to eat larger quantities of high-fat food than we
know is in our longer–term health interests. Many find that rather than do the
study that we see is needed to enhance our career prospects, we are more
strongly motivated to spend our time doing other things. We cannot easily
change personality traits and habits that we see are against our interests. Few
of us can effortlessly ‘turn the other cheek’ even when we can see mentally
that it is in our interests to do so. We find it very hard to do things we are
not motivated to do.
However, humanity in general has not yet developed a comprehensive
capacity to resolve these conflicts. When we see that our motivations and
emotional responses are causing us to behave contrary to our interests, we
cannot just change our motivations or override them. In general, humans have a
very limited ability to consciously change their motivations and emotional
responses to align them with the findings of their mental models. Increasingly
humans are discovering that although a particular course of action provides
immediate emotional rewards, it is not in their longer-term interests. However,
the fact that we can see this does not automatically empower us to change the
way we will respond emotionally, or enable us to choose to be more highly
motivated to pursue our longer-term interests. Humans have no comprehensive
capacity to align their internal reward and motivation system with whatever
goals they may set using their mental models (Stewart, 2000).
If we could align our motivations with our mental goals, it would mean
that once we used our mental modelling to identify a long-term goal, we would
be able to find motivation and satisfaction in whatever we had to do to pursue
the goal. Behaviour that was normally highly motivated and rewarding would no
longer be so if we saw that it conflicted with our central goal. We would be
able to effortlessly defer immediate gratification whenever it was in our
longer-term interests to do so. We would be able to change the emotional
responses and motivations that entrench any personality traits and cognitive
patterns that stand in the way of achieving our goals.
Far from being able to consciously change our likes, dislikes,
motivations and emotional responses, we are barely aware of them and their
effects on our behaviour. We tend to look out the world and see how we can
change it to achieve desired emotional states, rather than look inwardly and
see how we can change our emotional states. We tend to take our emotional
responses and motivations as fixed and given, rather than as things we can
control consciously (Stewart, 1997b). Instead of seeing our motivations,
values, likes, dislikes and personality traits as limiting our adaptability, we
see them as defining who we are.
The burgeoning self-help and human potential literature is evidence
that humans are experiencing these conflicts, and that we do not yet have a
comprehensive ability to resolve them in our interests. This is underlined by
the findings of a comprehensive survey of self-help literature undertaken by
Covey (1989): much of the literature is directed at techniques to enable
individuals to reduce the power of motivations and emotional responses that
clash with their longer-term interests (e.g. techniques for deferring immediate
gratification), and is directed at techniques to enable individuals to find
satisfaction and motivation in the pursuit of longer-term objectives. He also
found that many religious practices (hymns, mediation, prayer etc) serve these
functions.
In summary, humans do not have the ability to align their internal
reward and motivation system with goals of their choosing. They are unable to
choose to find satisfaction and motivation in whatever adaptations will serve
these goals. If humans had such a capacity, they could choose to implement
whatever actions would advance the evolutionary success of humanity, and they
would find satisfaction and motivation in this. Without such a capacity, we are
not able to implement many adaptations that are in the evolutionary interests
of humanity. We continue to spend our lives pursuing internal rewards and
motivations established by our evolutionary and social past, even though we now
are equipped with a capacity for mental modelling that is increasingly superior
in adaptive terms. The immensely powerful technologies humanity is developing
such as genetic engineering and artificial intelligence are being harnessed to
serve our internal reward and motivation systems, not to advance our
evolutionary potential.
For these reasons, our psychological adaptability is fundamentally
limited in evolutionary terms. Adaptations exist that are superior in
evolutionary terms, we can see that they are superior, but we do not implement
them. Our motivations and emotional responses severely constrain what we can
do. Because of this psychological limitation, humanity is not yet able to take
advantage of the superior ability of mental modelling to discover and implement
the most effective adaptations. We can see that it is potentially far superior
to gene-based natural selection, but are unable to exploit this potential.
3.
CAN THESE PSYCHOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS BE OVERCOME?
Can humanity overcome its current psychological limitations? Rather
than continue to pursue only internal proxies for evolutionary success, can
humanity develop the capacity to use mental models to identify and implement
whatever adaptations are best in evolutionary terms? Can we, for example,
develop new psychological software that will enable us to align our internal
rewards and motivations with whatever actions are identified by our mental
modelling as being in our evolutionary interests?
The theory of metasystem transitions developed by Turchin (1977) points
to the type of psychological reorganisation that might overcome these
limitations. Turchin’s theory deals in large part with the evolution of new
adaptive capabilities in organisms. He suggests that these typically emerge
when a new level of control arises that manages a collection of pre-existing
adaptive processes. The new level of control might, for example, manage the
pre-existing processes so that they henceforth serve a new adaptive objective.
The new controller would align the goals and operation of the pre-existing processes
with the new adaptive requirement. The result would be a new metasystem S’ in
which sub systems Si (the pre-existing adaptive processes) are
integrated by a new mechanism ‘C’ that controls the Si. The
emergence of the new system S’ is a metasystem transition (MST). Turchin
demonstrates that the emergence of learning, association and other key
milestones in the evolution of adaptability in organisms can be usefully
interpreted within this framework.
This framework suggests how the current psychological limitations of
humanity might be overcome. Humans would need to develop a new psychological
structure (‘C’ within the above framework) that is able to manage and control
their internal reward and motivation system. The new structure would use mental
modelling to identify the actions that would contribute best to the
evolutionary success of humanity, and it would manage the pre-existing adaptive
processes so they motivate and reward those actions.
We can draw on the work of Conant and Ashby (1970) to identify one of
the key capacities that the new psychological structure must have if it is to
manage the pre-existing adaptive processes effectively. Conant and Ashby
demonstrated that if a regulator is to regulate a complex system effectively,
it must include a model of the system. So the new psychological structure would
have to develop models of the operation of the pre-existing adaptive processes
themselves. To develop these models, the new structure would have to acquire
knowledge about the pre-existing adaptive processes, how they operate, what
effects they have on behaviour, and how their operation could be modified,
influenced and managed. Emotional states, motivations and other elements of the
pre-existing adaptive processes would have to become the objects of
consciousness.
This suggests that the emergence of the new psychological structure
would have to involve the turning of attention inwards—individuals would have
to develop the capacity to direct their attention inside themselves and become
aware of their mental, emotional and physical states. What evidence is there
that humans can develop such an ability, and what might it lead to? We can
begin to answer this question by examining the experiences of individuals who
carry out the practice of introspective meditation. A significant part of this
practice involves individuals directing their awareness and attention at their
internal mental and other states. Meditators report that they can enter a state
in which there is a clear distinction between the flow of thought and feelings
on the one hand, and the “I” that observes these on the other—the meditator is
aware of herself as an observing “I” that is separate from her emotional
states, thoughts and sensations—they arise and pass (see, for example, Deikman,
1996). This state contrasts with much of normal experience in which the “I’
tends to be absorbed in emotional reactions and thoughts and is not aware of
itself as separate to them.
Foreman (1998) provides evidence that extended meditation can, at least
in some cases, produce this separation between the observing “I” and mental
contents during normal life activities. The individual experiences the
separation even when not meditating. In this state, thoughts, emotions and
sensations as well as things in the external environment are experienced
continually as objects of consciousness.
This emergence and strengthening of a self-aware, observing “I” is an
important step toward the formation of the new psychological structure that is
an essential part of the MST we are interested in. Because the new “I” is
separate from mental contents, it can observe the pre-existing adaptive
processes in action and accumulate the knowledge needed to model and understand
their operation. However, this is only a first step. The observing “I” reported
by introspective meditators is largely passive. It does not develop a
comprehensive capacity to modify and manage the operation of the pre-existing
adapting processes in the pursuit of evolutionary or other objectives. Techniques
in addition to meditation are needed to develop a new “I” that has the will and
power to do this.
A system of techniques that are specifically claimed to produce such a
new “I” has been outlined by Nicol (1980a). Nicol was originally trained in
this system by G. I. Gurdjieff and P. D. Ouspensky, but its historical origin
is not clear (Moore, 1999). The practices have been taught in various forms in
many countries since the 1920’s by a number of groups, some organised
internationally (Needham, 1995). However, the system has not been studied and
tested systematically by academic psychologists, although a number of the
specific practices and insights of the system are very similar to some that
have been adopted and developed for use in clinical psychology, cognitive
therapy and Neuro-Linguistic Programming (see, for example, Tart, 1986).
The techniques are explicitly directed at developing a new “I” that
manages the pre-existing psychological processes of the individual in the
service of whatever aims are adopted by the new “I” (Nicol, 1980b). The new “I” or master is produced by a
number of practices that begin by functionally separating the individual’s
psychology into an observing part and an observed part (Nicol, 1980c). The
observing part is the precursor of the new “I” or master. But initially it is a
passive and non-judgemental witness of the observed part, broadly equivalent to
the observing “I” that is developed through introspective meditation. From the
outset, however, the observing “I” produced by Nicol’s techniques is developed
during the normal activities of life, rather than through a separate practice
such as meditation.
The observed part includes the physical sensations, emotions,
motivations, mental images and thoughts that arise as the individual goes about
her daily activities and interactions—the observed part is the pre-existing
adaptive processes in operation. A key objective of the system is to develop
the ability of the observing “I” to stand outside and not be absorbed in the
stream of mental contents that comprise the observed part. Separation between
the precursor to the new “I” or master and the pre-existing adaptive processes
is essential for the eventual development of a master that is functionally
independent of the pre-existing processes and that can therefore manage and
modify them.
As the new “I” develops, the techniques utilised by the system enable
the “I” to accumulate knowledge about the operation of the physical, emotional
and mental adaptive processes, the effects they have on behaviour, and how
their operation can be modified and influenced to bring their goals into line
with the central aims of the new “I”. This enables the “I” to develop mental
models of the pre-existing processes and how they can be managed. The “I” develops
these capacities in much the same way that the individual earlier developed the
ability to manage her external environment—the individual first became aware of
her external environment and of objects within it, then gradually accumulated
knowledge about how the environment responded to her interventions, and used
this to develop the capacity to manage external circumstances to achieve her
adaptive goals. Now the individual turns her attention inwards and develops the
capacity to manage and modify elements of her internal environment.
The new “I” or master that finally emerges is free of the adaptive
goals of the pre-existing adaptive processes. It is able to modify these goals
to align them with its own goals and objectives. The pre-existing processes no
longer operate as constraints or restrictions on what the individual can decide
to do. She can now find motivation and emotional satisfaction in whatever
activities serve her central aim.
Key techniques and practices that are used by the system to develop the
new “I” or master are self-observation, dis-identification, self-remembering,
and divided attention.
Self-observation is the lynchpin of the system (Nicol, 1980c). It
begins the functional separation of the individual’s psychology into an observing
part and an observed part. Self-observation requires the individual to turn her
attention inwards and observe the physical sensations, emotional states and
thoughts that arise during the normal activities and interactions of every-day
life. This process has nothing in common with an individual cataloguing her
personality attributes and traits. Instead it involves the individual standing
outside and passively observing the actual sensations and states as they arise,
in real time.
Self-observation must be passive and non-judgemental to develop full
separation between the observing “I” and the operation of the pre-existing
adaptive processes. Without this separation, the individual’s “I” will be
identified with the thoughts, emotional states and sensations that arise—it
will be absorbed in and participate in them; it will not stand outside, observe
and ultimately be able to manage them; the individual will continue to be her
thoughts and emotional responses. Passive and non-judgemental self-observation
helps to ensure that the observing “I” dis-identifies with mental contents.
At first an individual finds it difficult to maintain dis-identified
self-observation for any length of time—she will tend to slip back into
identification with thoughts or emotional states, and will fail to be able to
stand outside or observe them for extended periods.
Self-remembering is an important technique for overcoming this
difficulty. It strengthens the developing “I” or master, and renews its
functional separation from the pre-existing adaptive processes. In
self-remembering the individual simultaneously is aware that she is present and
has the aim of developing a new “I” while also being aware of her physical,
emotional and mental states. This act of self-remembering enables the
individual to dis-identify and separate from the pre-existing processes, and to
renew and strengthen self-observation. With practice an individual can enter a
state of self-remembering whenever she experiences a strong emotional state
that would otherwise control her behaviour. This provides the individual with
the opportunity to choose consciously how to act in response to the emotional
state.
Divided attention is a practice related to self-remembering in which
the individual remains aware that she is aware while observing physical,
emotional and mental states and going about normal daily activities.
Self-remembering and divided attention are very important for
developing the power of the new “I” to manage the pre-existing processes. Once
the emerging new “I” can remain functionally separate from motivations and
emotional impulses, and once it can remain aware that it is separate from them
and can act independently of them, it can decide whether or not to be
influenced by them. Instead of ‘going with’ these impulses as they arise, it
can decide not to act on them. Importantly, this functional separation also
enables the new “I” to control the disposition of attention. This enables the
“I” to direct attention and energy only at activities that serve the aims of
the “I”. In these ways, the emerging new “I” can begin to consciously free the
individual from control by the internal reward system.
But this form of management is limited to working with existing
motivations and emotional impulses. To gain full control over its internal
reward system, the new “I” must be able to develop motivations and emotional
responses appropriate to its goals in circumstances that would not have
previously evoked those responses. It must be able to find motivation and satisfaction
in all the behaviours and actions needed to achieve its objectives.
The key techniques described by Nicol for the development of this
capacity are based on the use of visualisation and the imagination. For
example, if the individual wishes to develop new responses and motivations for
particular circumstances and activities, the individual would imagine and
visualise themselves in the circumstances in ways that evoke the desired
responses. The system’s approach is based on the view that individuals cannot
control the operation of their emotional and motivational systems by thoughts
or by self-talk alone. This view is consistent with the fact that the
motivation and emotional system of humans evolved long before humans acquired a
capability for language, and before our mental capacities were highly
developed. So our emotional responses and motivations are not controlled and
evoked by our thinking and by our self-talk. Rather they are evoked by the
patterns we perceive in the circumstances we encounter (particularly patterns
in social situations). For this reason, the new “I” must learn to communicate
with the individual’s motivation and emotional system primarily through images
and imagined experiences rather than thoughts alone.
The use of visualisation and imagination in this way is consistent with
the ‘re-scripting’ techniques that are identified by Covey (1989) as a common
element in many systems of personal development. It is also consistent with the
conclusions reached by Cosmides and Tooby (2000) about the evolutionary
function of imagined experience in re-weighting emotional responses to
particular circumstances.
Through experimentation and self-observation, the emerging “I” builds
up a repertoire of skills and techniques for managing the pre-existing adaptive
processes. Many of the skills it develops have counterparts in therapeutic
systems such as clinical psychology, psychotherapy, hypnotherapy, cognitive
therapy and psychoanalysis. However, the essential difference is that in this
system, the ‘therapist’ is the new “I” or master—the therapist is internalised
as a new psychological structure within the individual.
It is worth emphasising here that the new “I” would not manage the
pre-existing emotional and motivational systems by overriding and repressing
them. The most effective way it can manage is by letting the pre-existing
processes continue to solve the adaptive problems that they have evolved to
handle, as far as possible. The new “I” is not in a position to take over their
functions entirely. Instead the new “I” will do better if it limits its
interventions to adjusting the goals of the pre-existing systems to align them
with its own goals and aims. Just as the new “I” would continue to rely on the
operation of the adaptive systems that control the individual’s internal
physiology, it would also continue to rely on the pre-existing motivation and
emotional system. It takes them along with it in pursuit of new objectives. For
example, it would continue to use the ability of the emotional system to
quickly recognise significant patterns in social situations and in other
circumstances. And it would integrate these abilities into the new metasystem
for use in other cognitive functions.
In fact, an individual who has developed a new “I” will have more
varied and diverse emotional responses than one who has not. This is because
the existence of an “I” that can unite the pre-existing processes behind a
central aim allows the pre-existing processes to differentiate and diversify
where this is beneficial to the central aim—the processes can be more diverse
without threatening the coherence of the individual’s psychology. Such a
differentiation and diversification of managed sub-systems is a characteristic
of all MSTs (Turchin, 1977 and Stewart, 1997c)).
What evidence exists about the effectiveness of the system of
techniques and practices outlined by Nicol? As indicated above, there are no
systematic third person studies of the use of the practices and of their
effects. However, there is an extensive and growing literature of first person
reports (for an annotated bibliography see Driscoll, 1985 and 1999). In
general, these reports suggest that the use of the practices for only a short
period can provide an individual with some experience of what it would be like
to develop a new “I” or master—it is relatively easy for an individual to get a
“taste” of what it would be like to consciously manage her the pre-existing
physical, emotional and mental processes. In particular, it is not difficult
for the individual to achieve a state in which she experiences the “I” as
standing outside the pre-existing processes, and is able to modify their impact
on her behaviour when she chooses. However, to achieve the state on a more or
less permanent basis is more difficult: very few report that they have been
able to do so, and then only after persistent use of the practices over many
years.
The literature does not include any reports of individuals using the
system to pursue the goal of future evolutionary success. The original
proponents of the system did not promote its use for evolutionary objectives in
the sense used in this paper. However the system is obviously capable of being
used to enable individuals to adopt and pursue evolutionary ends, or any other aim
for that matter. It could be used to produce a psychological transformation
that would enable individuals to implement whatever actions would contribute
most to the future evolutionary success of humanity. Such a MST would overcome
the psychological limitations that currently restrict our evolutionary
adaptability. The system of techniques and practices would produce a new “I” or
master that could manage the pre-existing physical, emotional and mental
adaptive processes so that they will serve the evolutionary ends identified by
the new “I”. Assisted by mental modelling, the new “I” would use mental
modelling to identify the actions that would contribute most to the future
evolutionary success of humanity, and would manage the pre-existing processes
to ensure that the individual found motivation and satisfaction in taking those
actions. Pre-existing motivations, emotional responses, inculcated behaviours,
beliefs and habits of thinking would no longer prevent the individual doing
what is best in evolutionary terms. The new “I” would be capable of revising
any personality traits or behavioural predispositions that would otherwise
stand in the way of achieving evolutionary objectives.
The new “I” would also use mental modelling of the individual’s mental
processes to search for ways to improve their operation. It would eliminate
unproductive and negative habits of thinking, and use mental models of the
modelling process itself to improve and adapt the modelling capacity (see, for
example, Heylighen, 1991).
In general, the new “I” would be able to revise and recreate the
individual’s pre-existing adaptive processes continually through time to meet
whatever evolutionary challenges may arise. Humans who successfully worked on
themselves to undergo this metasystem transition would become self-evolving
beings—organisms that are able to adapt in whatever ways are necessary for
future evolutionary success, relatively unfettered by their biological past or
by their previous life experiences (Stewart, 2000).
Will humans make the transition to become self-evolving beings? Will we
develop the capacity to consciously modify our pre-existing adaptive processes
so that we can take whatever actions are best for future evolutionary success?
The key impediment to making this transition it that it is not easy. In
the present circumstances with current techniques and practices, significant
personal effort, commitment and perseverance is necessary if an individual is
to make the transition. For many, the prospect of being able to make a greater
contribution to the evolutionary success of humanity is unlikely to provide
sufficient motivation for the considerable investment required.
Nevertheless, increasing numbers of individuals are likely to develop
the ability to manage their pre-existing adaptive processes, although not
initially for evolutionary purposes. This is because the acquisition of this
ability can provide immediate benefits to individuals. Individuals will be far more
effective at achieving their key goals if they have the ability to align their
pre-existing adaptive processes with those goals. They will be able to find
satisfaction and motivation in all the actions needed to achieve their goals.
In contrast, individuals who do not develop this psychological capacity are far
less effective at pursing their goals. They are not able to implement actions
that are not motivated and rewarded by their pre-existing processes, even
though the actions may be essential for achieving their goals. They are not be
able to revise personality traits or habits of thought that stand in the way of
achieving their goals.
The advantages accruing to individuals who can manage their
pre-existing processes will increase progressively as humans get better at
using mental models to foresee the consequences of their actions. As knowledge
accumulates, humans will increasingly see situations in which the actions
motivated by their internal reward system are inconsistent with their goals.
Increasingly their mental modelling will be superior to their pre-existing
adaptive systems at identifying the best actions for achieving their goals.
The advantages of self-management will manifest most clearly where
humans strongly compete with each other, such as in economic markets.
Competition creates winners and losers. Individuals who can use self-management
to achieve their competitive goals will have a significant competitive
advantage. They will tend to out-compete those who are unable to do so. And the
gap will widen as knowledge accumulates and modelling improves. The incentives
for the development of self-management will increase.
This is exactly what is occurring in market-based economies. Economic
success is increasingly going to those who have some ability to self-manage. It
is no accident there is a rapidly growing demand from business for personal
development training and literature. Many corporations now train their
executives in practices such as Neuro-Linguistic Programming, meditation, techniques
designed to improve emotional intelligence and other self-development
practices.
The spread of self-management skills is self-reinforcing. As well as
the demonstration effect, the higher the proportion of individuals who are able
to self-manage, the more those without the skills will be disadvantaged.
Furthermore, as self-management spreads, individuals will increasingly
encounter situations in which they will be called upon to behave as if they are
self-managers. This effect can be expected to be particularly strong within
families. Children brought up by self-managers will be continually subject to
different demands and expectations to those who are not. Increasingly humans
will grow up and operate in a social environment that demands and encourages a
capacity for self-management. Eventually, a psychological transformation that
once required enormous personal effort will occur routinely to many as they
grow up amongst others who have already undergone the transformation.
Once an individual has undergone the psychological MST that enables
self-management, it is a very small step to use self-management for
evolutionary objectives. The individual will be able to adopt the aim of
pursuing evolutionary success for humanity without having to be a psychological
altruist. This is because she will be able to use the capacity for
self-management to find psychological satisfaction and motivation in whatever
it takes to pursue evolutionary success.
An individual will be more likely to adopt evolutionary objectives once
she can mentally model (and therefore understand) the past psychological
evolution of humanity, and the future possibilities. This understanding will
tend to undermine the possibility that the individual could continue to find
meaning in a life spent pursuing only the satisfactions provided by their
pre-existing internal reward and motivation systems. The individual will see
that these have no absolute validity or value. They are past evolution’s best
attempt to get us to behave in ways that will bring evolutionary success. But
they are a flawed attempt that is inferior to what can be achieved when we
supplement our adaptive ability with mental modelling. The individual will see
that she does not have a choice about whether to pursue evolutionary objectives.
The only choice is whether to do so guided by incompetent and outdated means,
or to do so consciously, using the superior capacity of mental modelling. The
individual will see that humans who continue to be guided only by their
pre-existing reward and motivation systems are as absurd as a wind-up toy
soldier that has run into a wall and fallen onto its back, but continues to
march, on and on.
In summary, there are a number of factors and processes that can be
expected to encourage the emergence of a new psychological MST amongst humans.
But whether these influences will be sufficient to establish the transition
widely amongst humanity is not yet clear.
5. CONCLUSION
Humanity is on the threshold of a major evolutionary transition.
Before the transition humans are organisms whose behavioural goals are
set ultimately by their internal reward and motivation system. The internal
rewards have been established and tuned by natural selection and conditioning
processes. As a result, humans spend their lives pursuing proxies for
evolutionary success. Humans have the capacity to use mental models to predict
the effects of alternative actions on their environment. But they are largely
limited to using this capacity to discover the actions that are best for
achieving internal rewards. Humans do not use it for identifying and
implementing adaptations that are best in evolutionary terms. Before the
transition, humans are largely incapable of implementing behaviours that are
inconsistent with their pre-existing reward and motivation system, even where
their mental modelling reveals that the behaviours are far more adaptive in
evolutionary terms. They are unable to use the much superior potential of
mental modelling to discover the best adaptations.
If humans make the evolutionary transition, they will no longer blindly
pursue internal rewards and motivations as ends in themselves. They will use
their mental models to identify and implement the actions that will contribute
most to the evolutionary success of humanity. By consciously managing their
pre-existing adaptive systems, they will ensure that they find satisfaction and
motivation in pursuing evolutionary objectives. They will no longer be
incapable of using the superior adaptive capability of mental modelling to
adapt their behavioural goals.
Humans are currently part way through the transition. As our ability to
model the consequences of our behaviour improves, we are increasingly
encountering situations in which our mental modelling is superior to our internal
reward system at organising adaptive behaviour. We are beginning to develop the
new psychological software needed for us to implement the behaviour identified
by our mental models in these circumstances. But to develop a comprehensive
ability to do this, humans will need to undergo a psychological MST. We will
need to develop a new “I” or master that can manage our physical, emotional,
and mental adaptive systems to align their goals with evolutionary objectives.
This would enable us to revise the operation of these pre-existing processes so
that we could adapt in whatever ways are needed for evolutionary success.
Humans would become self-evolving beings, able to consciously choose to change
our adaptive goals, relatively unfettered by our biological past or by our
conditioning.
It is too early to say with certainty that humanity will negotiate this
transition successfully. But it is clear that the unfolding of the transition
will be given impetus as humans become aware of the nature of the transition,
its significance in evolutionary terms, and their possible role in it.
I gratefully acknowledge the benefit of useful comments from David
Richards, Wilson Kenell and Peter Hendricks.
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